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Abstract   
This paper uses panel Granger causality tests to study the relationship between sector 
specific FDI and CO2 emissions. Using a sample of 18 Latin American countries for the 
1980-2007 period, we find causality running from FDI in polluting intensive industries 
(“the dirty sector”) to CO2 emissions per capita. This result is robust to controlling for 
other factors associated with CO2 emissions and using the ratio of CO2 emissions to 
GDP. For other sectors, we find no robust evidence that FDI causes CO2 emissions. 
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I. Introduction 
The share of total foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to less developed countries 
(LDCs) as a share of total world FDI has increased from 25% in the 1990s to 31% in the 
2000s.1 These inflows have been encouraged and welcomed by LDCs because of the 
important role they play in domestic economies as a source of growth and job creation. 
However, there are concerns that LDCs could competitively undercut each other’s 
environmental regulations to attract FDI (Elliot and Shimamoto, 2008). This “race to the 
bottom” in LDCs may result in these countries becoming “pollution havens”, where 
multinational corporations (MNCs) locate operations in order to save on environmental 
related costs. In this scenario, the MNCs that have more to gain from relocating are those 
in the most polluting intensive or “dirty” industries. Therefore, as LDCs continue to 
attract significant shares of FDI flows, it is important to assess whether FDI inflows to 
LDCs are associated with higher levels of pollution.   
 In this study, we analyse the link between FDI and CO2 emissions in Latin America 
from 1980 to 2007. In particular, we conduct a panel Granger causality test of the 
relationship between FDI and CO2 emissions. This approach allows us to address two 
important issues. First, it helps us to obtain more reliable estimates on the relationship 
between FDI and CO2 emissions by addressing causality in the relationship. Second, 
since we are working with macro data, a panel approach allows us to increase the number 
of observations significantly and to draw conclusions that are region specific. In addition, 
our analysis expands on previous work by using FDI data disaggregated by sectors. 
Therefore, we are able to explore whether increases on FDI in pollution intensive sectors 
are associated with higher CO2 emissions in Latin America. 
  Latin America is an interesting case study for exploring the relation between FDI 
and CO2 emissions. This region receives the most capital inflows to LDCs after Asia, 
with a share of total FDI inflows around 30% (UNCTAD, 2010). In addition, as 
developing countries continue to grow, their CO2 emissions have become an important 
issue in international agreements related to trade and the environment. 
 The results of our study indicate that FDI inflows in the pollution intensive sectors 
can be linked to increases in CO2 emissions, but the same relationship does not hold for 
FDI in other sectors. Hence, policy makers in the region could benefit from considering 
this differentiated environmental impact of FDI.  
 The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section II, we discuss the 
relationship between FDI and pollution with a review of the current literature. Section III 
provides a theoretical framework. Section IV describes the data used in the analysis, 
while section V covers the methodology. The discussion of the results with robustness 
tests is included in Section VI, and Section VII concludes.  
 
II. FDI and the Environment: A Review of the Literature 
 
There is considerable literature studying FDI flows into LDCs. This interest is due, to 
some degree, to the significant increases of FDI inflows to LDCs over the last decade. 
Moreover, FDI has attracted attention as a potential engine to economic growth in 
emerging economies. The benefits of FDI on growth stem from its long-term nature, the 
creation of capital stock and employment and the transfer of skills and technology that 
lead to greater productivity (Borensztein, et al., 1999). These potential benefits of FDI 
over other types of capital inflows and the interest of MNCs to relocate have made 
attracting FDI an important component of the economic agenda in many emerging 
economies. Therefore, there is a strong competition among LDCs to attract FDI. 
 An important issue is whether lax environmental standards are part of the increasing 
desire of MNCs to relocate abroad. It is possible that the competition among LDCs may 
have induced a "race to the bottom” in relation to environmental regulation, where 
pollution-intensive MNCs relocate to LDCs with less stringent environmental standards 
(Xing and Kolstad, 2002). This is known as the "pollution haven" hypothesis (Grossman 
and Krueger, 1991; Mani and Wheeler, 1998). The empirical evidence has been mixed, 
with various studies finding no support for the pollution haven hypothesis (Mani and 
Wheeler, 1998; Eskeland and Harrison, 2003; MacDermott, 2009 and Wagner and 
Timmins, 2009).  
 The lack of consistent evidence in favor the pollution haven hypothesis may suggest 
that environmental regulations are unlikely to have an effect on plant location since the 
MNCs savings from lower environmental regulation could be small. Moreover, it is 
possible that pollution intensive industries relocating to LDCs can have cleaner 
production methods than similar domestic industries (see Grossman and Krueger, 1991). 
According to this view, FDI to LDCs may bring cleaner technologies in the long run. 
Likewise, it is expected that domestic firms will eventually acquire the cleaner 
technologies of foreign firms. This view is known as the “pollution halo” hypothesis and 
supports the notion that the presence of foreign-owned firms may yield substantial 
environmental benefits to LDCs (Grossman and Krueger, 1991; Zarsky, 1999; Antweiler, 
et al., 2001; Birdsall and Wheeler, 2001; Talukdar and Meisner, 2001). In general, the 
empirical evidence on the link between FDI and pollution has been ambiguous and 
concrete policy recommendations are difficult to make.  
 A possible explanation of the ambiguity in the empirical results across studies lies in 
the differences in the scope (or question) and the empirical approach (including 
differences in econometric methodologies, lack of comparable data, and proxies). The 
empirical approach to study the relationship between FDI and the environment can be 
seen from two perspectives. One approach relates to the studies that attempt to assess if 
firms choose to locate in countries with low environmental standards by using industry 
level data, measures of environmental stringency and pollution intensities by industries 
(using pollution abatement expenditures either at home and/or abroad). The majority of 
this work is composed of case studies or firm level analysis. A source of concern with 
this approach is that it is difficult to measure and to account for environmental stringency 
(Eskeland and Harrison, 2003; Albornoz, et al., 2009; Wagner and Timmins, 2009). 
 A second approach in the literature has concentrated on the impact of FDI on the 
environment. That is, once firms are located in other countries it is expected that the 
pollution levels will increase. In this context, it is argued that pollution levels could also 
work as a proxy of environmental stringency. Studying the empirical link between FDI 
and pollution is still a difficult task. Available data on country level FDI for developing 
countries tends to be at the aggregate level while FDI as a cause of pollution might be 
more related to certain types of industries. Moreover, pollution data by industry seldom 
exists for these types of countries.    
 An additional limitation of both approaches is that most of the existing analyses do 
not study the causality between FDI, environmental policy and pollution. Causality is 
important since it is possible that MNCs relocate to countries which already have high 
pollution concentrations.  Conversely, MNCs may relocate to LDCs, and this will lead to 
an increase in pollutants concentrations. Moreover, these two situations are not mutually 
exclusive. In the literature, the most common approach assumes environmental regulation 
(or pollution) as a function of FDI or vice-versa. Since the impact of FDI on pollution 
may go both ways, the empirical methodology should take into account this bi-
directionality. Only few studies have addressed this type of problem by conducting a 
causality or cointegration analysis (see Hoffmann, et al., 2005; Merican, et al., 2007; 
Acharyya, 2009; Lee, 2009). These studies have found that, in most instances, FDI can 
clearly be linked to pollution or environmental damage. In the next section we discuss the 
current literature and some of the trends of FDI and pollution in the case of Latin 
America.  
 
FDI and the Environment in Latin America 
 The environmental consequences of globalization have been subject to a global 
heated debate. According to the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center (CDIAC) 
in the last twenty years LDCs have more than doubled their carbon dioxide emissions 
(CDIAC). Moreover, developing countries are Annex II countries under the Kyoto 
protocol and are exempt from any mandatory emissions reduction.2 In Latin America, 
total CO2 emissions have been on the rise. Moreover, CDIAC reports that four countries 
of the region (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela) belong to the list of countries 
producing 90 percent of the world carbon dioxide emissions. Mexico and Brazil alone 
account for 52.7 percent of the 2007 regional emissions and belong in the list of top 20 
highest fossil-fuel CO2 emitting countries (Marland, et al., 2008).3  
  FDI flows to Latin America have increased dramatically over the past decades. 
Figure 1 illustrates the trends of pollution intensive and non-pollution intensive FDI, 
where both categories have been on the rise. Although there was a dramatic fall in FDI in 
2000-2001, possibly because of the volatility in macroeconomic fundamentals in 1999, 
the 2000 Argentinean crisis and the 2001 US recession; the trend has in general been 
positive. Figure 2 depicts the trend of pollution intensive FDI as a share of total FDI, and 
it shows that the participation of dirty industries on total FDI has been relatively stable 
over time. Moreover, when looking at FDI flows into pollution intensive sectors 
disaggregated by industry, we find that the industries with the highest growth were 
mining, oil and chemical (Figure 3). 
  There is a scant literature on the relationship between FDI and pollution for the case 
of Latin America. Most of these studies are limited by the scope of the data used and, in 
most cases, they rely on a small sample period or a small number of observations. 
Moreover, most of the research for the region is country specific, and very few empirical 
studies have considered the region as a whole. In general, the overall evidence on the 
relationship between FDI and emissions is, at best, mixed. 
 Some studies, such as Cole and Ensign (2005), MacDermott (2006), Barbier and 
Hultberg (2007), and Waldkirch and Gopinath (2008) among others, have found evidence 
that MNCs locate operations in Latin America as a result of low environmental standards. 
MacDermott (2006), for example, finds that FDI from the United States can be associated 
with the pollution haven hypothesis after NAFTA. Conversely, Biglaiser and Staats 
(2008) is one of the most recent studies that do not find support for the pollution haven 
hypothesis for Latin America, they use a survey of American executives of corporations 
with presence in Latin America and find that investment risk is the main factor driving 
FDI in the region. Additionally, Grossman and Krueger (1991), Carrada-Bravo (1995), 
and Cole and Ensign (2005) do not find empirical evidence that Mexico became a 
pollution haven with NAFTA. Furthermore, Birdsall, et al., (2001) find support for the 
“pollution halo” hypothesis in the case of Chile. 
 Our paper contributes to the above literature by looking at the causal relationships 
between FDI and the CO2 emissions. We take a panel approach, which increases the 
number of observations significantly and allows us to draw conclusions that are region 
specific. In addition, our analysis expands on previous work by using FDI data 
disaggregated by sectors. We explore whether FDI in certain sectors is associated with 
greater emissions in Latin America. Moreover, our methodology differs from previous 
analyses as we incorporate time series econometric techniques that provide more reliable 
estimates on the relationship between FDI and pollution. Next, we describe the 
theoretical framework, the data used in our analysis and the econometric methodology. 
 
III. Theoretical Framework 
 
The theoretical framework loosely follows Baumol and Oates (1988) and List and Co 
(2000). Since pollutant emissions are generated during production, we can consider 
without loss of generality that these emissions are inputs to the production process. 
Hence, the profits of a plant in region j are given by the following equation: 
  (1) 
where G is the vector of inputs and other characteristics which include labor, capital, 
distance to the markets, export and import taxes. Z is the amount of emissions used in 
production and  is the unit price of emissions. Setting ,  where 
the superscript asterisk indicates the profit maximizing choice, the profits of the firm can 
be expressed as follows: 
  (2) 
 Equation (2) shows profits as a function of the input intensities and their prices. In 
the absence of any environmental regulation, the private marginal cost of emissions is 
zero (that is ). will increase with higher or more stringent environmental 
regulation. Thus, the degree that environmental regulation (as reflected in ) can affect 
the firm’s profits depends on the pollution intensity of production. The profits of firms 
with high  will be more sensitive to changes in . Therefore in our analysis we 
concentrate on whether FDI in industries with high pollution intensities has a differential 
effect on pollution. 
 Thus, other things equal a firm will relocate to the region where  is the lowest. 
However, in many cases a new location implies also a new set of prices  associated 
with different cost of labor, energy transportation, and imports and exports tariffs. It is 
likely that once a plant faces different prices, the input intensities will also change.  
 This implies that FDI will flow from a region with strong to non-existent (or weak) 
environmental regulations if the following condition is satisfied: 
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where the subscript s denotes if the region enforces environmental regulations and w is 
the region without environmental regulations. To simplify Equation (3) we can assume 
that  in the region with weak environmental regulation. Under the condition 
shown in Equation (3), the region with low environmental restrictions will receive FDI 
from high pollution intensity industries. However, notice that, as mentioned before, other 
inputs and characteristics in G can affect the location decision of the plant.  
 The location decision of the firm will depend on the actual values of the parameters 
in Equation (3) which requires estimating these values. Since it is difficult to compile 
firm level data consistent throughout the region to estimate the profit function for each 
plant, we look at FDI inflows to Latin American countries and sorted by different sectors 
in order to assess their effect on CO2 emissions. That is, if the condition above holds then 
we would expect to observe that pollution intensive industries would relocate to countries 
with lax environmental regulation, leading to higher emissions in these countries.  
 
IV. Data  
 
 Our pollution measure is the growth in CO2 emissions per capita. CO2 is a pollutant 
commonly used in the literature because of its contribution to global warming, and it is 
generally involved as a main variable of concern in international agreements 
(Smarzynska and Wei, 2001; Talukdar and Meisner, 2001; Hoffmann, et al., 2005; 
MacDermott, 2006; Merican, et al., 2007; Acharyya, 2009; MacDermott, 2009). 
Furthermore, CO2 emissions are the only indicator related to the environment that is 
available consistently over time for Latin American countries.  
* *
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 Previous work has used CO2 emissions growth (Hoffmann, et al., 2005), total CO2 
emissions (Acharyya, 2009), CO2 emissions to GDP ratio (MacDermott, 2009) and CO2 
emissions per capita in levels (Talukdar and Meisner, 2001; MacDermott, 2006). Few 
other papers have used other pollution measures such as SO2, NOx and PT (see Xing and 
Kolstad, 2002; MacDermott, 2006; and Waldkirch and Gopinat, 2008). We place 
emphasis on the growth of CO2 emissions per capita since total emissions can be 
associated with population growth (see MacDermott, 2006). We construct the growth of 
CO2 emissions per capita as the first difference of the natural log of CO2 emissions per 
capita. For the purpose of robustness, we use an alternative indicator of pollution. We use 
the growth of the CO2 emissions to GDP ratio at 2005 constant international dollars 
(using purchasing power parity rates; where growth is constructed as the difference of the 
natural log). Both indicators of CO2 emissions were obtained from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI, 2010).  
 Regarding FDI, we expand the literature by considering FDI inflows disaggregated 
by sector. As mentioned in Section III, plants in sectors with higher pollution intensity 
would be, at least in theory, more likely to be located in regions with weak environmental 
regulations. Therefore, to determine the type of capital inflows that are more detrimental 
to the environment we consider the three main different sectors: primary, secondary, and 
tertiary. We believe that this sectoral disaggregation for Latin America is an important 
contribution since most of the existing literature uses aggregate measures of FDI. 
Roughly speaking, the primary sector includes agricultural and mining activities, the 
secondary sector manufacturing activities, and the tertiary sector services. Table 1 shows 
a description of the industries/sectors included in each category. However, some 
industries within the sectors have vast differences in pollution intensities. Therefore, we 
consider an additional indicator that aggregates FDI in pollution intensive industries only. 
Considering FDI in pollution intensive industries is also a key contribution of this paper. 
 The methodology to categorise an industry as pollution intensive varies in the 
literature. For example, Kahn (2003) uses energy use and the toxic inventory, whereas 
List and Co (2000) considers emissions by industry and pollution abatement operating 
expenditures. Jaffe et al. (1995) and Levinson (1996) use pollution abatement capital 
expenditures as a percentage of new or total capital expenditures to compute an indicator 
of pollution intensity. Table 1 shows the industries that were considered as pollution 
intensive in some of the previous studies. Despite the differences in the number and detail 
of sectors, as well as in the methodology to obtain the pollution intensity, there are vast 
similarities in the industries labeled as pollution intensive. For example, chemicals, 
petroleum and primary metals are regarded as pollution intensive by most of these 
studies. Based on this information and the available data on disaggregated FDI, we 
categorise as pollution intensive: mining, quarrying and petroleum, wood and wood 
products, paper and paper products, chemicals and chemical products, non-metallic 
mineral products, metal and metal products, electrical and electronic equipment, and 
motor vehicles and other transport equipment. Hence, we create a pollution intensive or 
“dirty” sector comprised of these industries. 
 We also construct FDI inflows in different sectors (primary, secondary, tertiary, 
dirty) as a share of GDP. The data on FDI disaggregated by sector comes from the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development Data Extract Service Desk 
(UNCTAD/DITE, 2010). We construct FDI by sector as a share of GDP using data from 
the World Development Indicators (WDI, 2010), and use the natural log of the sectoral 
FDI inflow as a share of GDP.  
 Other control variables considered in the analysis are real GDP per capita (in 
constant 2000 US dollars) and the manufacturing value added share of GDP. We are 
interested in the growth of these variables, where both indicators are used as the first 
difference of the natural log and were obtained from the WDI (2010). The 18 Latin 
American countries considered for the estimations are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. The 
period of analysis considered is between 1980 and 2007.4 Tables 2 and 3 present a 
description and the summary statistics of the variables used in this analysis. 
 
V. Methodology  
 We use a Granger causality test in order to determine the relationship between 
sectoral FDI inflows and pollution emissions. The Granger causality test is based on the 
Vector Autoregressive (VAR) framework. Our empirical methodology contributes to the 
literature in the following two ways. First, our analysis focuses on Latin America and 
uses sectoral FDI. To our knowledge, there is no other analysis that looks at the region as 
a whole and uses a data on FDI by sector. We specifically test the impact of FDI inflows 
in those industries that are considered the most polluting. Second, we expand on previous 
work by using a Granger causality test in a framework that takes into consideration 
country characteristics and time specific effects. To check the robustness of our results 
we: i) extend our analysis to a multivariate VAR, where we control for other variables 
related to CO2 emissions and ii) use CO2 emissions to GDP ratio as an alternative 
indicator of emissions.  
The modeling used for our Granger causality test, which relates to Hoffmann’s et al. 
(2005) analysis, is explained in detail below. The panel VAR framework used in this 
analysis is specified as follows: 
  (4) 
  (5) 
Where y represents the growth of CO2 emissions per capita and x is the FDI inflows in a 
specific sector. The subscript i represents the country (i =1, 2, … N) and t represents the 
time period (t = 1, 2, … T). k represents the number of lags of the variables y and x 
included as regressors, and ai and τt represent the country and time fixed effects. It is 
assumed that x and y are stationary and that the error term in both equations is 
uncorrelated white noise. 
 We have an unbalanced panel for the estimations of equations 4 and 5 due to missing 
observations for the sectoral FDI variables. The Granger causality test for our analysis 
takes the following steps. First, using equation 4 to test causality from FDI to pollution, 
we set the following hypotheses: 
Ho: , where FDI does not cause CO2 emissions per capita growth 
Ha: , where FDI does cause CO2 emissions per capita growth 
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An F statistic is constructed using the normal Wald test for the coefficient restrictions. If 
Ho is rejected, then we can conclude that there is evidence that FDI in a specific sector 
Granger causes CO2 emissions per capita growth. If we fail to reject Ho, there is no 
evidence of causality running from sectoral FDI to CO2 emissions. 
 Second, to test causality from CO2 emissions to sectoral FDI, we use equation 5 and 
set the following hypotheses: 
Ho: , where CO2 emissions growth does not cause FDI inflows 
Ha: , where CO2 emissions growth does cause FDI inflows 
In this case, rejecting Ho will lead to conclude that CO2 emissions will cause FDI inflows 
in a specific sector. Our model is specified in Equations 4 and 5 in a bivariate VAR form, 
but it can be extended to a multivariate form by expanding the number of regressors. 
Since our main focus is on the impact of FDI on CO2 emissions, we limit our discussion 
of Granger causality running from FDI to CO2 emissions. For the multivariate VAR, 
following Talukdar and Meisner’s (2001) approach, we include GDP per capita growth 
and the growth of manufacturing value added as a share of GDP. Both indicators are 
likely to be important determinants of pollution and CO2 levels. 
 The Granger causality test with fixed effects used in this analysis provides the 
advantage of accounting for country characteristics and time effects. Including country 
and time fixed effects in a panel VAR estimation allows us to deal with omitted variable 
bias, an important aspect when considering causality.5 In particular, country fixed effects 
control for characteristics that do not change for a given country, such as the proximity to 
γ j = 0
j=1
k∑
γ j ≠ 0
j=1
k∑
the US or other markets. The time effects control for events within a year that are 
common to all the countries such as regional economic crisis or variations in oil prices.  
 Furthermore, an important condition for the validity of our analysis is that the 
variables used in the analysis are stationary. We perform the panel unit root test that 
assumes individual unit root processes proposed by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) in the 
following variables: FDI by sector in levels (all in natural logs), CO2 per capita growth, 
CO2 to GDP ratio growth, GDP per capita growth, and manufacturing value added share 
of GDP growth (for all variables, growth estimated as the first difference of the natural 
log). We reject the null hypothesis that the series are non-stationary at the 5 percent level 
for all the variables. The number of lags included in the estimations is selected according 
to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). 
 
VI. Results  
 Table 4 presents the estimates of the Granger causality test with fixed effects 
specified in the methodology section for the bivariate and multivariate VAR. The Table 
presents the F test (along with the probability in parenthesis) and also, in brackets, the 
table presents the addition of the coefficients of the causally prior lagged regressor in the 
estimation (independent variable in the estimation). Number of lags and observations are 
also provided in Table 4.   
 In Table 4, the estimates in column 1 present the Granger causality test when we use 
total FDI inflows, and columns 2-4 when we use FDI in primary, secondary and tertiary 
sectors. Estimates in column 5 of Table 4 are those derived from the Granger causality 
test when we use the aggregated FDI inflows to dirty industries. Looking at the bivariate 
VAR results, there is evidence that sectoral FDI Granger causes CO2 emissions in 2 cases 
at the 5 percent level of significance. When using FDI in the tertiary and dirty sectors, 
this null hypothesis is rejected at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. When looking at 
causality running from CO2 emissions to sectoral FDI for the bivariate VAR, we find 
that, at the 5 percent level, we do not reject the null hypothesis that CO2 emissions do not 
Granger cause FDI. 
 For the purpose of robustness, we estimate the Granger causality test in a 
multivariate VAR that includes the growth of GDP per capita and manufacturing value 
added. Estimates of Granger causality test for the multivariate VAR are also shown in 
Table 4. We find that the null hypothesis that FDI does not Granger cause CO2 emissions 
is rejected only when we use FDI inflows in the dirty sector. For all the other estimations, 
that use FDI in different sectors (total, primary, secondary, and tertiary), we fail to reject 
the hypothesis that FDI does not Granger cause CO2 emissions. For the multivariate 
VAR, we find that we fail to reject the hypothesis that CO2 emissions Granger cause FDI 
in all cases. 
 We also explore whether our results are robust to using the growth of the ratio of 
CO2 emissions to real GDP. This indicator is useful since changes in economic activity 
can affect CO2 emissions, and it directly represents the emissions to output intensity of 
production. Thus, cleaner technologies could be reflected in lower emissions of CO2 per 
unit of real GDP. In Table 4, column 6 shows the estimates obtained for the Granger 
causality test using the growth of the ratio of CO2 emissions to real GDP and FDI in dirty 
sectors. When we use this alternative indicator of pollution emissions for the bivariate 
and multivariate VAR, we only find evidence of causality running from FDI in dirty 
sectors to CO2 emissions at the 1 percent level. This corroborates our previous results.6 
 The estimates for the bivariate and multivariate VAR models with aggregate FDI in 
dirty industries are shown in Table 5. Columns 1 and 2 show the estimates for the 
bivariate model (coefficients with standard errors in parenthesis). When having CO2 
emissions as dependent variable in the bivariate VAR, we observe that the first and 
second lag of FDI in dirty sectors is statistically significantly at the 5 and 1 percent level, 
respectively. Estimates for the multivariate VAR are shown in columns 3 and 4. For the 
multivariate VAR, we find that FDI in the dirty sector continues to have a significant 
effect on CO2 emissions even when we control for other variables, where the second lag 
of FDI in the dirty sector is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. For the control 
variables, we find that the first lag of GDP per capita growth and the second lag of 
manufacturing value added growth have a statistically significant positive effect on CO2 
emissions at the 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. Estimates from the bivariate VAR 
when we use the growth of the ratio of CO2 emissions to GDP are shown in columns 5 
and 6. These estimates are very similar to those shown in columns 1 and 2 for the 
bivariate VAR with CO2 emissions per capita. When using growth of the ratio of CO2 
emissions to GDP, we find that the first lag of FDI in the dirty sector has a significant 
positive effect on CO2 emissions at the 10 percent level, while the second and third lag 
have a significant effect at the 1 and 5 percent level, respectively. 
 It is necessary to discuss the magnitude of the effect that FDI in the dirty sector has 
on CO2 emissions. Using the estimates shown in Table 4 for the bivariate VAR (where 
the growth of CO2 emissions per capita is the dependent variable and FDI in the dirty 
sector in the independent variable), we find the following effect for the average country. 
An increase on FDI in the dirty sector as share of GDP by one standard deviation 
increases CO2 emissions per capita by 0.96 percent in the next two periods after the initial 
increase on FDI in the dirty sector. An increase on CO2 emissions per capita of 0.96 
percent for the average country represents an increase of 0.03 emissions of CO2 metric 
tons per capita. This effect is of significant magnitude considering that for 2007, the 
emissions of CO2 ranged between 1 and 2 metric tons per capita for the majority of the 
countries in the sample (13 out of 18 have a value in this range). 
 In summary, our analysis shows that there is robust evidence that FDI in the dirty 
sector Granger causes CO2 emissions. This suggests that as FDI in the dirty sector 
increases, CO2 emissions are likely to increase, even after controlling for country and 
time specific characteristics. Thus, in line with MacDermott’s (2006) analysis for 
Mexico, our results suggest that there may be a significant negative environmental impact 
of FDI inflows in dirty sectors for the Latin American region. However, we find no 
robust effect of FDI in other sectors on CO2 emissions. Our results at first sight contrast 
with some of the previous findings by Grossman and Krueger (1991); Carrada-Bravo 
(1995); Birdsall, et al. (2001); Albornoz, et al., (2009). However, these studies did not 
considered the role of dirty industries separately and the possible endogeneity in the FDI-
pollution relationship. 
 
VII. Concluding Remarks 
 
 FDI to LDCs has increased over the last decades. As a result, academics and policy 
makers are interested on determining the environmental effects of these flows. In this 
paper, we analyze the relationship between FDI and CO2 concentrations in Latin America 
from 1980 to 2007 and provide insights on the environmental effect of FDI.  
 We find evidence that, in the case of some Latin American countries, FDI inflows in 
pollution intensive industries can be linked to increases in CO2 emissions per capita and 
per unit of GDP. Distinguishing the environmental effect of FDI by sectors is relevant for 
policymakers. It is unlikely that Latin American countries would want to restrict the 
inflows of FDI in the pollution intensive sectors since this form of investment represents 
a large share of total FDI. In our sample, about 37 percent of total FDI inflows have, on 
average, gone to pollution intensive industries. 
 An important policy implication of our analysis is that FDI in pollution intensive 
industries should be closely monitored. It is relevant for governments in the region to be 
aware of the detrimental effects that this form of FDI has on the environment. The 
creation of a fund for environmental improvement in these countries might be a possible 
policy action that will ensure better environmental conditions in the region. The size of 
this fund should be dependent on the amount of FDI in the polluting sectors and 
estimations of the environmental damage associated with the increase in CO2 emissions, 
where the public and private sector can contribute.  
 While our analysis shows that FDI in pollution intensive sectors causes higher CO2 
emissions in Latin America, we are unable to directly support or reject the pollution 
haven or pollution halo hypothesis. The lack of readily available firm level data for Latin 
America does not allow us to empirically test these hypotheses.  
 
  
Endnotes 
 
1 This information was obtained by calculating percentages of FDI flows using data from 
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 2011). 
2 It is important to note, however, that developing countries can work together with 
developed countries under the mechanisms of the Kyoto protocol and reduce emissions 
that will count toward developed countries quota. For example, China is the largest CO2 
emitter and while it has not signed specific agreements to cut back emissions, it has been 
willing to compromise in this issue. 
3 Mexico and Brazil emit more than 100 million metric tons of carbon. CDIAC reports 
that six other countries in the region are now emitting more than 10 million metric tons of 
carbon annually: Argentina (50.1), Venezuela (45.1), Chile (19.6), Colombia (17.3), Peru 
(11.7), and Trinidad and Tobago (10.1). 
4 Not all 18 countries and not all years are included in all the estimations due to data 
unavailability. 
5 Refer to Wooldridge (2002) for a discussion on fixed effects model in a panel 
framework and to Holtz et al. (1988) for a discussion on the benefits of using fixed 
effects in a panel VAR. 
6 Other estimations using the growth of the ratio of CO2 to GDP and FDI in different 
sectors are not included for purpose of space, but are available upon request 
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Figure 1 – Regional FDI total and disaggregated by more (less) pollution intensive 
industries* 
 
 
* Source: UNCTAD/DITE. 
 
Figure 2 – FDI flows to dirty industries as a share of total FDI to Latin America*  
 
 
* Source: UNCTAD/DITE. 
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Figure 3 – FDI to Latin America by Industry (Pollution Intensive Sectors)*  
 
 
* Source: UNCTAD/DITE. 
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Table 1 – Pollution Intensive Industries by Selected Study. 
 
Study SIC of Dirty Industries 
Akbostanci et al 
(2007) 
Basic Industrial Chemicals (3511); Fertilizers and Pesticides (3512); Iron 
and Steel (3710); Nonferrous Metal (3720) 
List et al (2004); List 
and Millimet (2004) 
Pulp and Paper Mills (2611-31); Printing and Binding (2711-89); Industrial 
Inorganic Chemicals (2812-19); Industrial Organic Chemicals (2861-69); 
Petroleum Refining (2911); Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastics (30); Stone, 
Clay, and Glass (32); Steel and Electrometallurgical Products(3312-3); Iron 
and Steel Foundries(3321-5); Fabricated Metal Products (34); Motor 
Vehicles and Equipment(371)  
Kahn (2003) Primary Metals; Stone, Clay and Glass Products; Petroleum and Coal;  
Chemical and Allied Products; Textile Mill Products. 
Greenstone (2002) Printing (2711-89); Organic Chemicals (2861-9); Rubber and 
Miscellaneous Plastic Products (30); Fabricated Metals (34), Motor 
Vehicles, Bodies, and Parts (371); Inorganic Chemicals (2812-9); Lumber 
and Wood Products (24); Nonferrous Metals (333-4); Petroleum Refining 
(2911);  Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete (32); and Pulp and Paper (2611-
31) and Iron and Steel (3312-3 and 3321-5). 
Kolstad and Xin 
(2002) 
High: Chemicals and Allied Products; Primary Metals Industries.  
Moderate: Food and Kindred Products; Industrial Machinery and 
Equipment; Electronic and Other Electric Equipment; Transportation 
Equipment. 
Becker and 
Henderson (2000)  
Industrial Organic Chemicals (2865 and 2869); Miscellaneous Plastic 
Products (308), Metal Cans and Barrels 3411 and 3412); Wood Furniture 
(2511); Commercial Printing, Gravure (2754); Motor Vehicle and Car 
Bodies (3711) 
List & Co (2000) Fabricated Meal Products (34); Stone, Clay, and Glass Products (32); Paper 
and Allied Products (26); Transportation Equipment (37); Primary Metal 
Industries (33); Chemicals and Allied Products (28); Petroleum and Coal 
Products (29). 
Mani and Wheeler 
(1998) 
Iron and Steel, Non-Ferrous Metals, Industrial Chemicals, Pulp and Paper, 
and Non-Metallic Mineral Products 
Levinson (1996) Petroleum and Coal (29); Chemicals (28); Primary Metals (33) 
Jaffe et al (1995) High: Paper and Allied Products; Chemical and Allied Products; Petroleum 
and Coal Products; Primary Metal Industries. Moderate: Furniture and 
Fixtures; Fabricated Metal Products; Electric, Electronic Equipment 
Tobey (1990) Iron Ore, Concentrates (281); Ores of Nonferrous Base Metals (283); 
Silver, Platinum, etc (681); Copper (682); Nickel (683); Lead (685); Zinc 
(686); Tin (687); Nonferrous Base Metals (689) , Pulp and Waste Paper 
(251); Paper and Paperboard (641); Articles of Paper (642); Pig Iron (671); 
Ingots (672); Iron and Steel Bars (673); Universal, plates (674); Hoops and 
Strips (675); Railway Material (676); Iron and Steel Wire (677); Tubes and 
Fittings (678); Iron, Steel Castings (679); Inorganic Elements (513); Other 
Inorganic Chemicals (514); Plastic Materials (581) 
 
 Table 2. Variable Description 
Variable Description 
CO2 per capita 
growth 
Log difference of CO2 emissions per capita (metric tons per capita). 
Source: Authors’ construction using World Development Indicators (2010). 
 
CO2 RGDP 
share growth 
Log difference of CO2 emissions as a share of real GDP (CO2 emissions kg per 
2005 PPP $ of GDP). 
Source: Authors’ construction using World Development Indicators (2010). 
 
FDI total   
(% GDP)* 
Log of the total FDI inflows as a share of GDP.  
Source: Authors’ construction using data from UNCTAD/DITE (2010).  
 
FDI primary  
(% GDP)* 
Log of the total FDI inflows in primary sector as a share of GDP. For FDI primary 
we aggregate FDI in the following categories: 1) agriculture, hunting, forestry and 
fishing, and *2) mining, quarrying and petroleum. 
Source: Authors’ construction using data from UNCTAD/DITE (2010).  
 
FDI secondary  
(% GDP) 
Log of the total FDI inflows in secondary sector as a share of GDP. For FDI tertiary 
we aggregate FDI in the following categories: 1) food, beverages and tobacco, 2) 
textiles, clothing and leather, *3) wood and wood products, *4) paper and paper 
products, *5) chemicals and chemical products, 6) rubber and plastic products, *7) 
non-metallic mineral products, *8) metal and metal products, 9) machinery and 
equipment, *10) electrical and electronic equipment, and *11) motor vehicles and 
other transport equipment. 
Source: Authors’ construction using data from UNCTAD/DITE (2010).  
 
FDI tertiary  
(% GDP) 
Log of the total FDI inflows in tertiary sector as a share of GDP. For FDI tertiary we 
aggregate FDI in the following categories: 1) electricity, gas and water, 2) 
construction, 3) trade, 4) hotels and restaurants, 5) transport, storage and 
communications, and 5) finance. 
Source: Authors’ construction using data from UNCTAD/DITE (2010).  
 
FDI dirty      
(% GDP) 
Log of the total FDI inflows in dirty industries as a share of GDP. For FDI dirty we 
aggregate FDI in the categories denoted above with “*”. 
Source: Authors’ construction using data from UNCTAD/DITE (2010).  
 
GDP growth Log difference of real GDP per capita (constant 2000 US dollars). 
Source: Authors’ construction using World Development Indicators (2010). 
 
Manuf. val. 
add. growth 
Log difference of manufacturing value added as a share of GDP. 
Source: Authors’ construction using World Development Indicators (2010). 
 
FDI aggregation by sector is done adding the available observations with a positive value. Variable is 
truncated for non-positive values in order to take natural log (a value of 1E-11 is assigned for non-
positive values). Series filled in with linear interpolation for missing observations.  
Table 3. Summary Statistics 
              
       
     Mean  Std. Dev.  Max.  Min.  Obs. 
       
Log and difference transformation (series used in the analysis) 
Variable name Transformation      
CO2 per capita growth D(Ln(CO2 per capita)) 0.013 0.103 0.511 -0.593 486
CO2 RGDP share D(Ln(CO2 per real GDP)) 0.002 0.100 0.534 -0.619 486
FDI total (% GDP) Ln(FDI total) 0.297 3.649 2.858 -30.542 381
FDI primary (% GDP) Ln(FDI primary) -2.942 7.135 2.804 -30.752 355
FDI secondary (% GDP) Ln(FDI secondary) -2.147 5.537 1.325 -29.703 361
FDI tertiary (% GDP) Ln(FDI tertiary) -1.233 4.580 2.612 -29.954 381
FDI dirty (% GDP) Ln(FDI dirty) -1.691 4.782 2.807 -30.752 327
GDP per capita growth D(Ln(GDP per capita)) 0.011 0.044 0.150 -0.164 486
Manuf. val. add. growth D(Ln(Manuf. val. add. share)) -0.009 0.096 0.529 -0.692 407
       
Raw series       
Variable name Transformation      
CO2 per capita None 2.913 3.952 27.862 0.325 504
CO2 GDP share None 0.360 0.259 1.573 0.091 504
FDI total  (% GDP) None 3.128 2.745 17.421 5.44E-14 381
FDI primary (% GDP) None 1.053 1.782 16.515 4.41E-14 355
FDI secondary (% GDP) None 0.624 0.644 3.760 1.26E-13 361
FDI tertiary (% GDP) None 1.373 1.869 13.630 9.8E-14 381
FDI dirty (% GDP) None 1.165 1.873 16.555 4.41E-14 327
GDP per capita None 3111.2 1942.7 10738.0 632.5 504
Manuf. val. add. None 18.163 5.654 34.560 5.548 426
              
Summary statistics of available observations for 18 countries, between the period 1980-2007 
Table 4. Granger Causality Test 
 
 FDI Total FDI Prim FDI Sec FDI Ter FDI Dirty FDI Dirty 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Null Hypothesis: FDI does not Granger-cause CO2 growth    
Bivariate 1.395 2.609 0.195 4.058 7.229 7.241 
 (0.249) (0.076) (0.900) (0.018) (0.000) (0.000) 
 [0.003] [0.002] [0.001] [-0.003] [0.006] [0.008] 
 <2, 337> <2, 313> <3, 300> <2, 337> <3, 272> <3, 272> 
       
Multivariate 0.342 0.894 0.817 1.741 7.355 6.717 
 (0.795) (0.410) (0.486) (0.178) (0.001) (0.002) 
 [-0.002] [0.0014] [-0.001] [-0.002] [0.003] [0.004] 
 <3, 282> <2, 275> <3, 264> <2, 299> <2, 253> <2, 253> 
       
Null Hypothesis: CO2 growth does not Granger-cause FDI    
Bivariate 0.790 0.225 2.089  0.296 0.356 0.374 
 (0.455) (0.798) (0.102) (0.744) (0.785) -0.772 
 [1.598] [3.236] [1.607] [1.267] [-3.794] [-3.268] 
 <2, 352> <2, 328> <3, 314> <2, 352> <3, 285> <3, 285> 
       
Multivariate 0.818  0.038  1.699  0.545  0.583  0.583 
 (0.485) (0.963) (0.168) (0.580) (0.559) -0.559 
 [7.110] [1.839] [3.474] [2.481] [-4.981] [-4.981] 
  <3, 296> <2, 290> <3, 277> <2, 314> <2, 266> <2, 266> 
F-values with probabilities in parenthesis and the sum of the coefficients of the causally prior lagged regressors in brackets. Lag and 
observation numbers indicated by <lag, obs>. Granger causality test estimated with country-time fixed effects and one FDI indicator 
at the time (in logs). We use the growth of CO2 per capita for estimations in columns 1 through 5, while column 6 we use the growth 
of CO2 as a share of real GDP. 
Table 5. VAR Estimates 
                 
 Bivariate Multivariate Bivariate 
 (CO2 per capita) (CO2 per capita) (CO2 GDP share) 
      
Dependent variable: CO2 growth     
       
FDI dirty t-1 0.002 (0.001) ** 0.001 (0.002) 0.002 (0.001) * 
FDI dirty t-2 0.002 (0.001) *** 0.002 (0.001) *** 0.002 (0.001) ***
FDI dirty t-3 0.002 (0.001)    0.003 (0.001) ** 
CO2 growth t-1 -0.276 (0.106) *** -0.097 (0.075) -0.287 (0.115) ***
CO2 growth t-2 -0.337 (0.086) *** -0.205 (0.069) *** -0.389 (0.077) ***
CO2 growth t-3 -0.013 (0.084)    -0.041 (0.086)
GDP per capita growth t-1   0.293 (0.144) **   
GDP per capita growth t-2   0.169 (0.108)   
Manuf. val. add. growth t-1   0.044 (0.052)   
Manuf. val. add. growth t-2   0.132 (0.050) ***   
Constant 0.120 (0.023) *** 0.004 (0.006) 0.122 (0.026) ***
R-sq 0.246  0.250  0.296  
Obs 272  253  272  
      
Dependent variable: FDI      
      
FDI dirty t-1 0.412 (0.204) ** 0.334 (0.282) 0.413 (0.201) ** 
FDI dirty t-2 -0.129 (0.157)  0.139 (0.219) -0.129 (0.153)
FDI dirty t-3 0.366 (0.215) *   0.364 (0.213) * 
CO2 growth t-1 -1.694 (2.228)  -3.979 (3.972) -3.044 (3.444)
CO2 growth t-2 -2.028 (2.124)  -1.002 (3.281) -0.577 (3.577)
CO2 growth t-3 -0.072 (1.889)    0.353 (2.181)
GDP per capita growth t-1   22.682 (11.517) **   
GDP per capita growth t-2   -11.620 (12.490)   
Manuf. val. add. growth t-1   1.557 (1.725)   
Manuf. val. add. growth t-2   2.802 (2.277)   
Constant -5.459 (3.794)  2.258 (1.202) * -5.500 (3.724)
R-sq 0.407  0.474  0.409   
Obs 285  266  285   
             
VAR model estimated with country-time fixed effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis. ‘***’, 
‘**’, '*" denote significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level. We use the growth of CO2 per capita 
in the first two sets of estimations, while we use the growth of CO2 as a share of GDP for the last 
set of estimates. 
 
